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Within Britain’s political circles there is a largely uncontested 
assumption that Africa should be treated differently from the rest of the 
world. This unanimity stems from a shared tendency to idealise Africa and 
Africans—and to idealise, in turn, Britain’s African policies.
When British politicians interact with Africa, they assume that their actions 
rise above their own national self-interest—that they are engaged in a 
‘noble cause’, transcending politics and commercial interests. Why is such 
a view so prevalent? This Development Viewpoint explores the meaning of 
Britain’s approach to Africa.
The idea of Britain ‘doing good’ in Africa was firmly established during 
Tony Blair’s time in Downing Street, that is, 1997-2007. Aid nearly doubled; 
the bilateral debt of Africa’s 18 poorest countries was written off; British 
forces intervened in Sierra Leone to restore order; Blair launched the 
Commission for Africa to develop a plan to help rescue the continent from 
its development impasse; and Britain made Africa the central theme of the 
UK presidencies of the EU and G8 in 2005. 
In a speech on Africa in Addis Ababa, 7 October 2004, Blair epitomised the 
British view of Africa:
“In all the things that I deal with in politics, and the things that make 
people cynical and disengaged from the political process, when I 
come and see what is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what 
could happen, I know that however difficult politics is, there is at 
least one noble cause worth fighting for.”
A Broad Consensus
The political consensus behind the Blair government’s work in Africa 
was exceptionally broad: encompassing the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives as well as all wings of the Labour Party. While there were 
disagreements among these political groupings on many other areas of 
policy, on Africa there was a united front. 
This consensus even seemed to extend to the international NGO 
community, other bilateral donors and multilateral institutions. As Clare 
Short, Secretary of State for International Development, explained, “…
you can just get on with what’s right: it’s in Africa’s interests, it’s in Europe’s 
interest, it’s in the world’s interests” (interview, 6 June 2007).
The notion that Britain is engaged in a ‘moral crusade’ in Africa derives 
from popular and historically deep-rooted conceptions of the continent 
as needy and helpless. The British role in this scenario is one of taking 
up the cause of the voiceless African poor in an honourable attempt to 
induce better governance behaviour from African leaders, who are usually 
described in either starkly ‘good’ or (more often) ‘bad’ terms (see Gallagher 
2009). 
This advocacy assumes, of course, a curious sense of a right or facility to 
speak for Africans. When the depiction of African actors is flattened in this 
way, the continent appears emptied of politics, and policy choices are 
reduced to the ‘progressive’ versus the ‘corrupt’. 
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The Idealisation of Africa
British self-idealisation stems, at least, from two factors. The first, previously 
mentioned, is the remarkable consensus on what Britain should do in Africa 
and how it should behave. The most heady expression of this consensus 
came in 2005 during the Gleneagles G8 summit, when thousands of people, 
organised by religious and development groups, and supported by all 
the main political parties, loudly expressed their support for Blair’s African 
initiatives. 
The second factor is the tendency of Britain to write off or sanitise its self-
interest in Africa. This position is plausible since Britain’s economic and 
geopolitical interests in Africa are relatively modest. For example, in 2006 
British exports to sub-Saharan Africa accounted for only 1.8% of its total 
exports, and two-thirds of these went to South Africa.
When politicians do talk about British interests, they are assumed to be 
‘enlightened’ interests that accord with Africa’s own development priorities. 
Politicians argue, for example, that eradicating poverty and conflict in the 
poor countries of the continent will prevent the disaffection and instability 
that drive people to migrate to Europe or turn towards terrorism.
But this apparent absence of selfish interests reinforces the sense that 
Britain’s Africa policy is rooted in ‘the good’ rather than ‘the political’. In this 
way, the perception that British policies are motivated purely by selfless 
concern for Africa remains unclouded by the complexity and ambiguity 
normally associated with more political relationships.
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Overall, the intense idealisation of British engagement with Africa represents 
something like a ‘sacred space’ in the middle of profane, messy politics. Even 
now, with dramatic cuts in overall public spending being contemplated, 
international development has been singled out by the Government 
and opposition parties as untouchable. For example, DFID’s bilateral aid 
allocation to Africa was set at £1.25 billion in 2008/9, £1.50 billion in 2009/10 
and £1.75 billion in 2010/11. 
Tellingly, British engagement with the continent appears to reflect a national 
self-image of competence, capacity and potency, which are more difficult 
to achieve in messier domestic policies or other more contentious foreign 
policies. Hence, it is plausible that Britain’s Africa policy in recent years tells 
us far more about its widespread anxiety about recapturing a sense of the 
good British state than about the development needs and priorities of 
Africa.
More Modesty and Realism
A neglected but key question is the impact of such actions on the outcomes 
for African development. Much has been written about the ineffectiveness 
of aid to Africa. For example, a well-known recent critic, Dambisa Moyo, 
has argued that aid has kept Africa in a dependent state because it has 
undermined opportunities to build strong and accountable political systems 
and stimulate domestic economic activities that can ensure sustained 
development (Moyo 2009). 
Others have pointed out the problems of attempting to impose policy 
prescriptions that run against the grain of African political culture. Tim Kelsall 
has suggested, for instance, that western ideals of democracy, law and 
redistribution have often failed in Africa because they do not fit with local 
political logics (Kelsall 2008). 
Britain’s development efforts in Africa are now focused on developing 
‘state capacity’ and promoting ‘good governance’. In this regard, its policy 
discourse projects a sense of British capability. In Africa, it is believed, things 
can be done and Britain can do them. But this has led to ambitious and over-
arching donor plans that are clumsily aligned with the complex, changeable 
and conflictual realities of African politics. Such mis-alignment of ambition 
and needs is more likely to arise when donor perceptions of African realities 
are flattened and idealised. 
Moreover, meaningful strengthening of state capacity and accountability in 
Africa cannot be realised from outside, no matter how well-intentioned such 
efforts might be. By definition, the means to achieve such objectives need to 
be negotiated and resolved among African actors themselves.
These points underline the importance of recognising the complex and 
unavoidably political nature of African problems. They also highlight the 
fact that state strengthening is difficult and contentious, and substantially 
impervious to the influence of external donors. 
In this context, donor support for African development requires, first, a 
more modest assessment of what a donor such as Britain can achieve and, 
second, an engagement that is rooted in a more complex and realistic 
understanding of African politics. 
Unfortunately, Britain’s recent fascination with Africa and its idealised view 
of how to address its problems is likely to be more related to anxieties about 
the capacity and potency of the British state than to any clear recognition of 
Africa’s concrete development needs.
References:
Gallagher, Julia (2009). “Healing the Scar? Idealizing Britain in Africa, 1997-2007”, African 
Affairs, 108: 432.
Kelsall, Tim (2008). “Going with the Grain in African Development?”, Development Policy 
Review, 26: 6.
Moyo, Dambisa (2009). Dead Aid: why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa, 
London: Penguin.
